Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications by Kilinc, M. & Neyapti, B.
Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 132–141
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Economic Modelling
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /ecmodBank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications☆
Mustafa Kilinc a,1, Bilin Neyapti b,⁎
a Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Istiklal Cad 10 Ulus, 06100 Ankara, Turkey
b Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey1 Tel.: +90 312 507 5409.
2 Moreover, Levine (1998) argues that legal rights o
development.
☆ We thank Cagri Saglam and an anonymous referee
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 312 290 2030; fax
E-mail addresses: Mustafa.kilinc@tcmb.gov.tra (M. K
(B. Neyapti).
0264-9993/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All
doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2011.08.023a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Accepted 31 August 2011
JEL classiﬁcation:
E44
G28
O16
Keywords:
Bank regulation and supervision
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iﬁcation. Barth et al. (2004) argue that regulations on securities,1. Introduction
The positive linkage between economic growth and ﬁnancial
market development has been well established. Dating back to
Schumpeter (1911), the literature emphasizes the transaction cost
reducing role of ﬁnancial intermediaries that facilitate investment
and hence lead to growth (see, for example, Goldsmith, 1969;
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988;
Rebelo, 1991). The interaction between ﬁnance and growth has
also been examined using an endogenous growth modeling
framework (see, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990;
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). In addition, there is compelling evi-
dence regarding the positive effect of ﬁnancial sector development
on economic growth (see, for example, King and Levine, 1993;
Levine, 1997, 2003; Beck et al., 2000).2
Given that banking systems are, to a large extent, still character-
ized by traditional functions, this paper focuses on a crucial institu-
tion: bank regulation and supervision (RS) that aims to increase
banks’ effectiveness in serving these functions via reducing theadverse selection and moral hazard problems.3 We propose an origi-
nal formal model to analyze the implications of RS, whose importance
has been heightened with a series of recent ﬁnancial crises that have
had global impact.4 A large number of recent academic studies, as
well as the reports of the Bank for International Settlement, have ex-
tensively discussed the elements that contribute to banking systems’
prudence; the revised Basle standards emphasize those elements in
providing guidance for banking sector reforms around the world.5
Taking stock of the arguments provided in this literature, Neyapti
and Dinçer (2005) propose a comprehensive set of criteria to measure
the intensity of legal framework for RS, based on the aspects of re-
strictiveness, transparency, and the width of coverage of banking
laws.6 The list of 98 criteria focuses on the extent of transaction cost
reduction in the banking sector and covers legal provisions ranging
from bank capital requirements, management, reporting, ownership,e activities, which are features of universal banking, do not con-
arket development but increase ﬁnancial instability. Drawing up-
n from the 2007 global crises, this paper, which speciﬁcally focus
nking functions, argues to the contrary.
Asia crisis in 1997, Argentine crisis in 2001, and especially the US
urities crisis in 2007, the last of which also drew attention to the
rsal banking regulation.
ought macroprudentials to the fore, hence drawn attention to the
rsal banking regulation and led to the formation of institutions
stemic Risk Board and European System of Financial Supervisors.
ased on 98 criteria that cover legal provisions such as bank capital
gement, reporting, ownership, lending, supervision and deposit
133M. Kilinc, B. Neyapti / Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 132–141lending, supervision to deposit insurance. Using the resulting index,
the authors provide empirical evidence on the positive relationship
between RS and growth in the sample of transition economies. The
index of RS also exhibits a positive association with deposits and in-
vestment, and a negative association with non-performing loans as
well as output losses arising from crises.7
This paper provides an original model that focuses on the welfare
implications of bank regulation and supervision in a dynamic general
equilibrium framework. The existing literature has addressed various
related issues only in partial equilibrium frameworks: Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) investigate the optimal monitoring intensity
based on the interactions between intermediaries’ and ﬁrms’ net
worth. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf (1984) pre-
sent models where adverse selection under imperfect information re-
garding the project returns of the borrowers leads to external ﬁnance
premium. Jensen and Meckling (1976) present a model with moral
hazard under costly monitoring and incentive problems and show
that lenders require a premium for the compensation of moral haz-
ard. Focusing solely on capital requirements, Rochet (2004) provided
a study of endogenous bank regulation in conjunction with monetary
policy. Repullo and Suarez (1999) study the effects of monetary poli-
cy on entrepreneurial moral hazard. Absent internal ﬁnancing, the
current model differs from the existing literature in that ﬁrms are
not distinguished on the basis of the moral hazard rates that are
linked with their net worth; it also refrains from monetary policy
issues.
The current model is based on the optimal solution of a dynamic
general equilibrium model of an economy that is composed of con-
sumers, ﬁrms and banks, which may be perfectly competitive or mo-
nopolistic. In order to focus on the linkage between the real sector
and RS, we avoid the issue of heterogeneity in risk exposure by as-
suming a representative bank. A representative consumer either
owns a representative ﬁrm, or, alternatively, ﬁrms that are distin-
guished on the basis of individual moral hazard rates. RS affects (pos-
itively) the rate at which a ﬁrm transforms credit into investment (in
accord with the transaction costs that arise from interrupted produc-
tion in the Diamond–Dybvig model), and the rate at which credit is
paid back to the banks. When ﬁrms are assumed to be homogenous,
banks are exposed only to a systemic risk imposed by RS. For the
sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the only type of moral hazard
is that of producer's.8 RS also affects consumers’ trust in the banking
sector and hence the deposit share of savings (both positively).9
Simulations of the model solution support that RS positively af-
fects the transitory growth rate as well as the steady-state income
level, wage rate and capital accumulation.10 As expected, the model
also implies that the interest rate decreases in RS and in the quality
of producers. Accordingly, simulations reveal that the optimal choice
of a social planner, or a bank owner, would result in the highest pos-
sible value of RS.11 The particularly interesting implications of the
model are observed in the case of heterogeneous producers and the
banks facing the question of monitoring or no-monitoring. The model7 See Dincer and Neyapti (2010) for the former; the latter evidence is available from
the authors. The authors also note for example that this measure of RS does not exhibit
nonlinearity in explaining the investment behaviour. Both Alen and Gale (2007) and
Shehzad and de Haan (2009) also argue that regulatory intensity reduces banking cri-
ses. Based on survey-based measures of bank regulation and supervision, however,
Barth et al. (2004) argue that regulatory and supervisory intensity reduces banking
efﬁciency.
8 In reality there are potential transaction costs that may emanate from banks also.
9 Neyapti and Dinçer (2005) and Dincer and Neyapti (2008) argue that well
designed deposit insurance schemes reinforce the quality of RS by reducing the likeli-
hood of moral hazard in the banking system.
10 Using an OLG model, Tchana (2007) obtains opposite results based on the assump-
tion that risky investments are more productive and bank regulation limits risky, or
productive, investments.
11 The bank manager may have shorter-term objectives than the owner of the bank,
as in a typical principal-agent problem.predicts that the adverse selection problem for banks, that is the
cost of not monitoring, increases as the distribution of producers
weighs heavily on the high-quality side. It is, however, optimal for
banks not to monitor when the distribution of producer types weighs
on the bad side (i.e. the distribution follows an F-type distribution on
the quality scale).12 Above some threshold level of RS and producer
types, it is also optimal for banks not to monitor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the
model for consumers, ﬁrms and the banks for the case of homoge-
neous producers. Section 3 analyzes the implications of the model
for the case of heterogeneous producers, when the bank faces the op-
tions of monitoring and no-monitoring. Section 4 is devoted to the
implications of the model regarding optimal RS and monitoring. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes.2. The model
The quality of bank regulation and supervision reﬂects the extent
to which transaction costs in the ﬁnancial sector are mitigated via for-
mal institutional mechanisms. Hence, it facilitates effective ﬁnancial
intermediation and thus has a positive effect on growth.13 This
paper investigates the welfare effects of RS in a general equilibrium
framework. The model consists of a representative consumer, a repre-
sentative ﬁrm and a representative (or, alternatively, a monopolist)
bank, who are all assumed to live inﬁnitely. The depositor's trust in
the banking system,14 the ﬁrm's decision to convert credit into in-
vestment as well as to repay its loan back to the bank are all positively
related with RS. The model includes twomain frictions in the bank in-
termediation process. The ﬁrst one is the informational problems that
lead to frictions in the deposit and credit markets, and the second one
is the friction caused by the monopolistic bank.
As typical, the (representative) consumer derives utility from life-
time consumption and leisure. Its budget is composed of wage income,
return on past savings, and ﬁrm's and bank's proﬁts - since the house-
hold is also assumed to own the ﬁrm and receives dividend from the
bank. Given its budget constraint, the consumer optimally chooses its
consumption (C) and savings (S). The portion of savings that is deposit-
ed in the bank (D) is positively relatedwith RS, as RS signiﬁes the extent
of the trust in the banking system. At the beginning of each period, the
consumer provides the ﬁrm with labor input N. The ﬁrm invests a por-
tion of the bank credit (CR), which is a positive function of RS, passing
the rest on to the consumer, and returns the principal and interest on
that portion of the credit back to the bank. Assuming that investment
is externally ﬁnanced (through bank credit), the ﬁrm optimally chooses
labor and capital.
The following notations are used throughout the rest of the paper.
Y for output, K for capital, N for labor,Π for proﬁt, C for consumption,
CR for credit, D for deposit, S for saving, W for the wage bill (w×N)
and r (rD) for the interest (deposit interest) rate. The intensity of
bank regulation and supervision (RS), which is denoted by α, can be
normalized to a number between zero and one. Lower case letters
are used to indicate per capita levels, such as y=Y/N and cr=CR/N.
In what follows, Section 2.1 outlines the model where banks are per-
fectly competitive. Section 2.2 explores the alternative case of a12 One may consider a good distribution of ﬁrm type to result from developed infor-
mal institutions or business culture.
13 Neyapti and Dinçer (2005) provide empirical support for this argument.
14 This may be thought to be particularly captured by the deposit insurance (DI) as-
pect of the RS index measured by Neyapti and Dinçer (2005) and Dincer and Neyapti
(2008). Deposit insurance systems may need to be more extensive in crises-prone
countries than in ﬁnancially healthy economies. Indeed, Dincer and Neyapti report that
there is only 30% correlation between the quality of DI and the rest of the RS index;
however, they also argue that their measure of DI contributes to the quality of RS.
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), on the other hand, argue that there may be a
trade-off between depositor safety and market discipline.
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lation results are also reported in each subsection.
2.1. A perfectly competitive banking sector
The following outlines the model set-up and solution for the rep-
resentative consumer, producer and the bank, in that order. As a
benchmark case, the representative bank takes interest rates as
given in a perfectly competitive setting, and optimally determines
the level of credit.
2.1.1. Consumer's problem
The representative consumer maximizes its lifetime utility from
consumption and leisure (L=1−N):
∑
∞
t¼0
γtU Ct ; Ltð Þ; 0 b γ b 1 ð1Þ
subject to the following constraints
Ct þ St≤wtNt þ αSt−1 1þ rDt−1
 
þ 1−αð ÞSt−1 þ 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
CRt
þΠFirmt þΠBankt
ð2Þ
αSt ¼ Dt ð3Þ
The consumer's budget is given in Eq. (2). Right hand side of the
equation is the income of the household, consisting of six terms: the
ﬁrst one is the wage income from labor supplied to the ﬁrm (wtNt).
The second and third terms are the gross returns from the savings.
As we explain in the text, households keep (1−α) part of their sav-
ings under the pillow15 and deposit remaining α portion in the
banks. Therefore, household gets gross returns on past savings St−1
as follows: (1−α)St−1 goes to the next period without any interest
earnings and αSt−1 earns a gross interest rate of (1+rt−1D ). So, total
income from savings St−1 in previous period is αSt−1(1+ rt−1D )+
(1−α)St−1. The fourth term, 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
CRt , is based on the assumption
that ﬁrms use CRt as credit from banks in period t, do not pay all of the
credit back to banks but keep 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
fraction for themselves. Since
ﬁrms are owned by households, we assume that they return that frac-
tion of credit to households, 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
CRt is an income item for house-
holds. Last two terms are the proﬁts of ﬁrms and banks. Since we
assume that households own ﬁrms and banks in the economy, their
proﬁts are remitted to the households. Once a household gets all of
his period t income, it decides on how to allocate it between con-
sumption (Ct) or savings (St), which constitutes the left hand side of
the equation.
It is assumed that the non-deposited portion of savings and the
non-invested portion of credits are both negatively related with α.16
Although separate parameters can be used to represent the extent
of consumer conﬁdence in the banking system and the extent of the
(lack of) moral hazard to be committed by the producer, the use of
a single term, α, simpliﬁes the exposition without any signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the model's implications. The justiﬁcation for this is as fol-
lows. As discussed earlier, the quality of bank regulation and
supervision (RS) is a summary measure, guided by the index15 This is a simplifying assumption. In a more realistic framework, one could consider
alternative investment and offshore-banking opportunities; these would probably
leave the model predictions mostly unaffected, however, as long as those funds also
do not return to the banking system.
16 Though deposit insurance may be an aspect of RS that directly affects the depositor
behavior, other aspects of RS that help eliminate adverse-selection and moral-hazard
risks may also boost the consumer's trust in the banking system—even in the absence
of effective deposit insurance.provided in Neyapti and Dinçer (2005), which is comprised of all
the legal aspects of bank regulation and supervision that includes
not only lending practices but also provisions related to bank man-
agement and deposit insurance. We thus conjecture that all these fea-
tures complement each other in providing a measure of the banking
system prudence, and hence affect the optimum behavior of all eco-
nomic agents in a similar fashion.
Based on the Lagrangian method of optimization, the ﬁrst order
conditions of the above problem for leisure and savings yield the fol-
lowing expressions:
UL Ct ; Ltð Þ ¼ wtUC Ct ; Ltð Þ ð4Þ
UC Ct ; Ltð Þ ¼ γUC Ctþ1; Ltþ1
 
α 1þ rDt
 
þ 1−αð Þ
h i
ð5Þ
where UL and UC represent the derivatives of the utility function with
respect to L and C. According to Eq. (5), the return on savings is
obtained in full when α=1. However, the consumer gets less than
full return on his or her savings, because savings are only partially de-
posited (when αb1). In the steady state, when αb1, there will be a
premium in the deposit rate above the interest rate implied by γ :
(1+rD)=[(1/γ)−(1−α)](1/α)N(1/γ). This premium and the depos-
it rate decrease in α and the premium disappears when α=1. There-
fore, when there is a lack of conﬁdence in the banking system, deposit
rate is higher than the rate implied by γ.
2.1.2. Producer's problem
We assume that there is a representative producer (chosen from a
continuum, facing the same technology) that maximizes its dis-
counted stream of proﬁts by choosing the level of K and N:
∑
∞
t¼0
γtλtΠ
Firm
t ¼∑
∞
t¼0
γtλt AtK
β
t−1N
1−β
t −wtNt− Kt− 1−δð ÞKt−1½  1þ rtð Þ
n o
ð6Þ
where λt is the marginal utility of the consumer and AtKt−1β Nt1−β is a
Cobb–Douglass type production function, where A denotes the level
of technology, which we assumed to be equal to 1 without loss of
generality. Producer pays wage (w) for each unit of labor it hires
(N) and interest for the credit used for investment, which is external-
ly ﬁnanced entirely through bank credit (CR). Capital stock evolves
according to the process:
Kt ¼ 1−δð ÞKt−1 þ It ð7Þ
where It is investment.17 The rate of conversion of credit into invest-
ment, as well as the rate of repayment of credit back to the banks, is
assumed to be given by:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
.18 Hence,
It ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt ð8Þ
Eq. (8) is a kind of credit-in-advance constraint for producers.
Since consumers own the ﬁrms and receive their proﬁts, the value
of proﬁt is equal to the marginal utility received from consumption.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the above problem for capital and labor17 Similar expressions for investment (as a function credit) are obtained as: a game
theoretic equilibrium between lenders and borrowers by Schneider and Tornell
(2004); a solution to the optimal contract problem by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001),
and a solution to limited contract enforcement in Hart and Moore (1997), which all
use a framework where internal ﬁnancing exists.
18 The square-root formula for the investment conversion rate implies 50; 71; 87 and
100% returns to credit for the RS values of 0.25; 0.50; 0.75 and 1, respectively. These
numbers also correspond to the non-performing loan ratios for those values of RS.
21 Discount rate may vary across different characteristics of people, such as age, in-
come groups and gender.
22
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1þ rtð ÞUC Ct ; Ltð Þ ¼ γUC Ctþ1; Ltþ1
 
β Ntþ1=Kt
 1−β þ 1þ rtþ1  1−δð Þh i ð9Þ
wt ¼ 1−βð Þ Nt=Kt−1ð Þβ ð10Þ
Eq. (9) indicates that the cost of credit in terms of foregone con-
sumption this period is equal to next period's return on investment;
investment yields the marginal product of capital plus the return
(capital gain) on the non-depreciated part of the capital. Because
credit demand determines the optimal level of investment, this ex-
pression implicitly accounts for the fact that the uninvested portion
of the credit, which is internalized by the consumer who is also the
ﬁrm owner, is also optimally determined.
2.1.3. Bank's problem (the benchmark case)
Taking deposits from the households and facing the market depos-
it and credit interest rates in a competitive setting, the representative
bankmaximizes its proﬁts by optimally choosing the amount of credit
in each period:
∑
∞
t¼0
γtλtΠ
Bank
t ¼∑
∞
t¼0
γtλt 1þ rtð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt− 1þ rDt−1
 
Dt−1
n o
ð11Þ
subject to following constraint
CRt≤Dt−1 ð12Þ
Both CR and D can be considered to be annual ﬂows. Here, credit
rationing is ruled out as a benchmark case of homogenous producers
who face the same level of credit interest. Then, the ﬁrst order condi-
tion for credit is given by Eq. (13):
1þ rtð Þ ¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
1þ rDt−1
 
ð13Þ
When there are no transaction costs (α=1), lending and deposit
rates are equal and they are both equal to the rate of time preference.
When there are transaction costs (αb1), however, there is an interest
spread: the lending rate exceeds the deposit rate, and both rates are
higher than the rate of time preference: (1/γ)b(1+rD)=(1/α)[(1/γ)
−(1−α)]b(1+r)=(1/α3/2)[(1/γ)−(1−α)]. This indicates that the
lending rate under no distortion (α=1) takes its lowest value; it in-
creases when consumer adjusts its deposits in an inverse relation to
α; and it further increases when α negatively affects the producer's de-
cision to pay credit back to the bank.19
Appendix 1 provides the list of equations that deﬁne this bench-
mark case of perfectly competitive bank's problem. All agents maxi-
mize their objectives with respect to the corresponding constraints.
Under the perfect markets case, all prices are taken as exogenous by
the agents. The list of equations in Appendix 1 and the market clear-
ing conditions provide a full competitive equilibrium.20 Partial deriv-
atives of the optimal interest rate, wages and credits with respect to α
are reported in Appendix 2.
2.1.4. Simulations19 Adding uncertainity and risk to the model will increase the complexity of the mod-
el considerably, altough we predict that the implications regarding α would remain
similar to the current one.
20 The model is solved and simulated using Dynare toolbox of Matlab, under the as-
sumption of perfect foresight.Fig. 1 shows the simulated trajectories of the optimal solutions of
model variables. The underlying parameter values are chosen as fol-
lows: the discount factor (γ) for a representative consumer is
0.9521; δ=0.1 approximates the rate of depreciation22; β (the in-
come share of capital) assumes the value of 0.34.23 The shock to α
is considered to be 0.1 units, leading to a jump from 0.8 to 0.9 for ex-
ample. The utility of the consumer is assumed to be of a log-linear
form, U(C,N)= log(C)+θlog(1−N), where 0bNb1 and θ is calibrated
to match the steady-state labor of N=0.33 that corresponds to
8 hours of daily working time.
As seen in Fig. 1, a shock to α causes permanent increases in cap-
ital and investment by more than 10%; credit, output, deposits by
about 5%; output per capita, consumption and the wage rate by
about 3%; labor by about 1%; and producer proﬁts by about 4%.
While increases in capital, output, output per capita, consumption,
and wages are gradual (spread over about 20 years); increases in
credit, investment, deposit, labor and proﬁt initially overshoot the
new steady-state values, also leveling off in 20 years. In addition, it
is observed that both credit and deposit interests fall gradually, the
latter falling more gradually than the former, leveling off at rates
11% and below 6%, down from the levels of 19% and 6.5%, respectively.
An interesting result is that savings fall by 7%, which means that a re-
duction in transaction costs leads higher proportion of savings to be
deposited, which results in higher credit, capital, output and con-
sumption for the same level of savings. In other words, facing a wel-
fare increase under higher RS, households can afford to save less.
Somevariables are overshootingwhen going to the new steady state
after an increase in α. This is due to the process of convergence to the
new steady state. For example, in Fig. 1, with an initial level of α=0.8,
the economy is in a steady state. With an increase in the level of RS to
0.9, the old steady state does not hold any more. With higher RS,
there will be higher level of capital and output in the economy in the
new steady state capital and output. As in a standard growth model,
when the initial steady state is below the optimal, there is a conver-
gence process. Therefore, investment increases at a faster rate initially
and overshoots. Since investment is connected to credit, credit also
overshoots and, similarly, since deposits are connected to credits, de-
posits overshoot also. Since capital and labor are complements in the
production, when investment shoots, labor also shoots to support the
output. We can see this convergence process in the growth rate of out-
put. The slope of the output in Fig. 1 is the growth rate of output. Initially
the slope is very steep since the initial point is far from the new steady
state, but as we get closer to the new steady state, convergence slows,
slope becomes ﬂatter and overshooting disappears.
Proposition 1. The higher the value of α the greater are the steady-
state levels of per capita output, wages, credit, investment and capital,
and the lower are the interest rates.
Simulations (not reported) also reveal that the smaller the level of
α to start with, the greater are the changes in the steady-state values
of output, consumption, capital, labor, investment, credit, deposit,
proﬁt, wage, interest rate and saving in response to a shock to α.24
Proposition 2. The smaller the initial value of α, the higher is the (tran-
sitory) growth rate.Nadiri and Prucha (1996) show that the depreciation rate for physical capital is
0.06 and for R&D is 0.12 for the US manufacturing sector.
23 Mankiw et al. (1992) show that β=1/3 for US.
24 According to the empirical investigation of Andres et al. (2004), growth dynamics
of the OECD countries cannot only be explained by convergence due to the transitory
dynamics; convergence in steady-state determinants play a great role for the observed
reduction in per-capita incomes. Changes in RS should be considered as among those
determinants; as the institutions literature suggests, transaction-cost reducing institu-
tions such as RS are part of the production technology.
Fig. 1. Perfectly competitive banks; responses of model variables to a (0.10) shock to α.
136 M. Kilinc, B. Neyapti / Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 132–1412.2. Bank as a monopoly
As alternative to the above benchmark case, we now consider the
case where the bank is a monopoly in the credit market and optimally
chooses the lending rate of interest; the deposit rate is still assumed
to be determined in competitive markets. In this case, credit rationing
is possible, and the producer optimally chooses N and credit demand,
instead of K:
∑
∞
t¼0
γtλtΠ
Firm
t ¼∑
∞
t¼0
γtλt AtK
β
t−1N
1−β
t −wtNt−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt 1þ rtð Þ
n o
ð6′Þ
The last term in the brackets of Eq. (6′) indicates the interest paid
by the ﬁrm on a portion of credits. Maximizing Eq. (6′) subject to the
constraints given by Eqs. (7) and (8) yields the following expressions
(Eqs. (10′) and (14)) for wage and credit demand, respectively:
wt ¼ 1−βð Þ 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt=Ntð β
h
ð10′Þ
crDt ¼ CRt=Nt ¼
β
1þ rt
  1
1−β
− 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ
" #
1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p  ð14Þ
The monopolist bank maximizes its proﬁts given by Eq. (11) with
respect to rt. Using Eq. (14), maximizing Eq. (11) subject to theconstraint (12) yields the following expression for r:
β
1þ rt
  1
1−β
− 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ
" #
¼ β
1þ rt
  1
1−β 1
1−βð Þ 1þ rtð Þ
" #
1þ rtð Þ−
1þ rDtﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
" #
ð15Þ
Eqs. (14) and (15) yield the following optimal solution for credit:
crt ¼
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p β
1þ rt
  1
1−β 1
1−βð Þ 1þ rtð Þ
" #
1þ rtð Þ−
1þ rDtﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
" #
ð16Þ
Partial derivatives with respect to RS are found positive for cr (and
hence for k,y and I) and w, and negative for (1+r), which are the
same results as in the case of perfectly competitive banks. To further
analyze the impact of RS, we next look at the magnitude and direction
of the effects of α on the simulated optimal trajectories of model vari-
ables over time, as reported below.
2.2.1. Simulations
Fig. 2 presents the simulation results of increasing α in the case of
monopolist bank. When these results are compared with the case of a
monopolist bank (see Fig. 2), we see that the effects of an increase in
RS are higher in the competitive banking case. For example, a closer
look at the ﬁgures shows that capital increases more than 10%, labor
increases more than 1% and output increases more than 4% in the
Fig. 2. Monopolist bank; responses of model variables to a (0.10) shock to α.
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10%, labor increase less than 1% and output increases less than 4% in
the monopoly case. Therefore, observable welfare effects of an in-
crease in RS are higher in competitive banking. On the other hand,
immediate responses of many variables are higher in the case of mo-
nopolistic banks, indicating some sort of volatility. These results arise
because monopoly is another source of inefﬁciency in the economy
and a monopolist bank restricts the amount of credit in addition to
moral hazard and asymmetric information problems. However, an
improvement in the RS might decrease the monopoly power in the
banking sector (not studied in the paper), and the results of monop-
oly would become closer to competitive case.
3. Heterogeneous producers
This sectionmodiﬁes the abovemodel assuming that producers vary
with a producer-speciﬁcmoral hazard rate: (1/pi), where i (=1…n) is an
index that indicates the producer type. pi is assumed to be distributed
Beta in the (0,1) interval, whose identifying parametersmay take differ-
ent values to proxy uniform, normal and skewed distributions. We spe-
ciﬁcally look at the cases of uniform, F and inverse-F distributions.25 To
clarify, regardless of the value of α, pi=1 indicates that the type i pro-
ducer is willing to both invest and pay back to the bank 100% of the
credit, and pi=0 means that all the credit received by producer-i is25 When the parameters of the Beta distribution are (1,1), uniform distribution is
obtained, when they are (2,2), the distribution proxies the normal distribution.used for consumption and not returned to the bank, 100% of the credit
turning into a non-performing loan.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 show these modiﬁcations and their implications
for the model's optimal solutions under the cases of both perfectly com-
petitive andmonopolist bank, respectively, facing heterogeneous agents.
Section 3.3 investigates, for both perfectly competitive and monopolist
bank types, the options of monitoring and not monitoring the producers.
3.1. Heterogeneous agents with a perfectly competitive bank
When there is a continuum of producer types, producer-i's problem
is given by:
∑
∞
t¼0
γtλtΠ
Firm
t;i ¼∑
∞
t¼0
γtλt AtK
β
t−1N
1−β
t −wtNt−pi Kt− 1−δð ÞKt−1½  1þ rtð Þ
n o
ð6′′Þ
The expression for investment (Eq. (8)) is also modiﬁed as:
It ¼ pi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt ð8′Þ
The bank's problem in case of heterogeneous producers is given by:
∑
∞
t¼0
γtλtΠ
Bank
t ¼∑
∞
t¼0
γtλt 1þ rtð Þpi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt− 1þ rDt−1
 
Dt−1
n o
ð11′Þ
138 M. Kilinc, B. Neyapti / Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 132–141Solving Eq. (11′) subject to Eq. (12) modiﬁes the bank's ﬁrst order
condition as:
1þ rtð Þ ¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
pi
 
1þ rDt−1
 
ð13′Þ
The optimal solution of this problem implies that the increase in pi
increases income, wages, credit and decreases the interest rate.26
3.2. Heterogeneous agents with a monopolist bank
A monopolist bank optimally chooses the interest rate, taking
given the credit demand of the producer, who optimally chooses its
credit and labor demand to maximize its proﬁts given by Eq. (6′′′):
∑
∞
t¼0
γtλtΠ
Firm
t ¼∑
∞
t¼0
γtλt AtK
β
t−1N
1−β
t −wtNt−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
piCRt 1þ rtð Þ
n o
ð6′′′Þ
which yields the modiﬁed ﬁrst order conditions given by Eqs. (10′′)
and (14′):
wt ¼ 1−βð Þ 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
pi CRt=Ntð β
h
ð10′′Þ
CRt=Nt ¼
β
1þ rt
  1
1−β
− 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ
" #
1=pi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p  ð14′Þ
Maximization of Eq. (11′) by a monopolist bank yields the follow-
ing revised ﬁrst order condition for (1+ rt):
β
1þ rt
  1
1−β
− 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ
" #
¼ β
1þ rt
  1
1−β 1
1−βð Þ 1þ rtð Þ
" #
1þ rtð Þ−
1þ rDt
pi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
" #
ð15′Þ
3.3. Monitoring or no-monitoring
In view of different potentialmoral hazard rates across the borrower
types, banks face the alternatives of either monitoring the producers
and assign them with individualized interest rates and credit; or not
monitoring them and give each borrower a uniform interest rate and
credit. In the case of no-monitoring, the expected producer type E(pi)
is taken into consideration. The monitoring cost can be assumed to be
a fraction of deposits and it increases with the extent of transaction
cost, or decreases in α. Optimum credit and interest rate decisions
under monitoring and no-monitoring are considered in Sections 3.3.1
and 3.3.2, respectively.
3.3.1. Monitoring (M)
Banks’monitoring cost is expressed as a portion of its only resource:
deposits, hence the bank's proﬁt at time t becomes:
ΠBankt ¼ 1þ rtð Þpi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt− 1þ rDt−1 þ ϕ αð Þ
 
Dt−1 ð11′′Þ
where we assume ϕ αð Þ ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃlog 1=αð Þp =100.27
Based on Eq. (11′′), the following ﬁrst order conditions for the
credit and interest rates are obtained for perfectly competitive and
monopolist banks, respectively28:
1þ rtð Þ ¼ 1=pi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
1þ rDt−1 þ ϕ αð Þ
 26 ∂(1+r)/∂pib0 ; ∂cr/∂piN0; ∂y/∂piN0; ∂w/∂piN0. These results hold under both
monitoring and no-monitoring schemes.
27 This function is chosen for its smooth form and the reasonable values it provides
for 0bαb1.
28 For a competitive bank, the partial derivative of the interest rate with respect to the
monitoring cost is: [∂(1+r)/∂ϕ(α)]N0.β
1þ rt
  1
1−β
− 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ
" #
¼ β
1þ rt
  1
1−β 1
1−βð Þ 1þ rtð Þ
" #
1þ rtð Þ−
1þ rDt
pi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
" #
3.3.2. No-monitoring (NM)
In case banks do not monitor the ﬁrms, the interest rate for the
expected producer type, E(pi), is uniformly charged to all ﬁrm types.29
Hence, the same amount of credit is extended to each producer type.
Accordingly, the optimum rates of interest for perfectly competitive
and monopolist banks are given, respectively, by:
1þ rtð Þ ¼ 1=E pið Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p Þ 1þ rDt−1 þ ϕ αð Þ
 
β
1þ rt
  1
1−β
− 1−δð Þ Kt−1=Ntð Þ
" #
¼ β
1þ rt
  1
1−β 1
1−βð Þ 1þ rtð Þ
" #
1þ rtð Þ−
1þ rDt
E pið Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
" #
As in the case of monitoring as well, pi is observed to affect the main
variables of the model in the same direction as α does. Simulations of
credit demand and supply for producer types that are worse or better
than E(pi) reveal that (see Fig. 3) there emerges excessive credit demand
for the ﬁrst type of (risky) borrowers, whereas there emerges excessive
credit supply for the low-risk type.30 Since each producer invests and
returns to the bankpi
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
percent of its credit, theworse is thedistribution
of producer types, the lower are the steady-state levels of investment and
output; and the higher are the level of non-performing loans and, hence,
the lower are bank proﬁts and consumer utility. Fig. 3 shows that the
banks’ proﬁt loss arising from higher than optimal interest rates offered
to the better-than-average type producer is larger than the loss arising
from offering lower than the optimal interest rates to the worse-than-
average type producer. This implies higher cost of adverse selection in
the case of better producer type than otherwise and hence, it appears
that it pays off to banks to monitor producers when producer type gets
better. Fig. 4 reports bank proﬁt and α relationship for different pi
distributions.
Proposition 3. Both bank proﬁts and consumer utility increases in
α—regardless of the type of producers’ distribution.
We additionally investigated the effects of income share of capital,
which can be viewed as the level of development. Fig. 5 shows that an
increase in α has a greater effect on bank proﬁts the smaller the β,
while the monitoring decision lowers proﬁts only slightly (with or
without monitoring, M). This indicates that the banking sector in less
developed countries is likely to beneﬁt more from reforming their reg-
ulatory and supervisory frameworks than the developed ones.
Proposition 4. The lower the value of β, the greater is the beneﬁt from
increasing α.
As another indicator of development, simulations are also run for a
higher rate of depreciation (δ=0.15). It is observed that the same
amount of an increase in α beneﬁts the country with higher depreci-
ation rate more than the other.31
4. Optimal regulation and monitoring
Given Proposition 3, increasing RS (α) always appears to increase
the welfare regardless of whether it is the social planner, who con-
siders the combined beneﬁt of the consumer with that of the bank,29 To obtain tenable numbers for model variables, simulations reported below are
based on the following range of pi values: 0.3≤pi≤0.9. Under no monitoring case
the ﬁrm assumes a uniform distribution which leads E(pi)=0.6.
30 The term excessive is in reference to the level of credit determined for the average
producer type [pi=E(pi)].
31 The results are available from the author upon request.
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banks still faces the decision tomonitor or not tomonitor. As in Neyapti
and Ozgur (2007)who demonstrate that a strong central policy author-
ity may relax the ﬁscal policy decision of decentralized governmental
bodies, one can envision that the reaction of banks to a high α can be
in the form of choosing not to monitor. Suppose that the bank choosesnot to monitor and hence applies interest rates as if all producers are
of the expected type (p=0.6).32Fig. 6 shows that thiswould lead to bet-
ter proﬁts than themonitoring scheme only if producers are distributed
Monitoring Costs and Non-performing Loans as % of Output
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Fig. 7. Welfare gains of increasing α.
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140 M. Kilinc, B. Neyapti / Economic Modelling 29 (2012) 132–141as F. In case the distribution type is inverse-F or uniform, however, NM-
scheme leads to lower bank proﬁts than the M-scheme. Hence, if banks
know the distribution of producers, the only case when they would op-
timally choose NM over M would be the case of F-distribution; in case
the distribution of producers is known to be good or uniform, then it
is optimal for banks to monitor.
To sum up, a high intensity of systemic regulation may lead banks to
relax their monitoring effort that may reduce welfare under uncertainty
regarding the producer type. A closer inspection of the simulation results
(not reported) reveals that only in case producers are uniformly of a veryF
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Fig. 6. Bank proﬁts: monitoring versus no-monitoring for different pi distributions.low-risk type (piN0.8) there is a range of α (αN0.6) for which banksmay
prefer not to monitor.
Proposition 5. The better the distribution of producers, the more it pays
to the banks to monitor than not to (though, in the extreme, higher α
leads to no need to monitor, indicating a nonlinear effect of α).
As a more general measure of welfare effects of α, we plot the mon-
itoring costs incurred by (monopolist) banks and non-performing loans
(both measured as percentage of output) against α.33Fig. 7 shows that
both of these indicators decline with α, indicating that increasing α is
indeed an efﬁciency-enhancing institutional attribute.34
5. Conclusion
This paper provides an original model that formally shows the
linkage between bank regulation and supervision (RS) and economic
performance. The model is based on optimizing consumers, pro-
ducers and banks, who live inﬁnitely. Since RS stands for the formal
institutional quality that affects the ﬁnancial market operations, it is
assumed to increase depositors’ trust in the banking sector, and de-
crease the extent of moral hazard by the producers and hence the
cost of monitoring facing the banks.
The solution of the model meets the basic predictions that RS posi-
tively affects the level of capital accumulation, income, deposits and
wages, and negatively affects the interest rates. Simulations also show
that increasing RS is associated with higher growth rates in transition
to a higher steady state. Besides showing the positive welfare gains of
increasing RS, the paper demonstrates that the positive impact of RS
on between bank proﬁts increaseswith the level of under-development,
indicating that banks in developing countries have a higher incentive for
reforming their banking laws than in developed countries. Simulations
also reveal the interesting result that proﬁt maximizing banks tend to
prefer monitoring over no-monitoring the higher the RS and the better
the distribution of producer types. This is because RS makes monitoring
costs lower for banks.
Appendix 1
The underlying equations of the model with perfectly competitive
bank33 This is true under any type of distribution of pi's since monitoring cost is assumed
to be a ﬁxed proportion of income for a given value of α.
34 A similar picture arises for non-performing loans under no monitoring.
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1. Yt=AtKt−1β Nt1−β
2. Ct þ St≤wtNt þ αSt−1 1þ rDt−1
 þ 1−αð ÞSt−1 þ 1− ﬃﬃﬃﬃαp CRt þΠFirmt þΠBankt
3. UL(Ct,Lt)=wtUC(Ct,Lt)
4. UC(Ct,Lt)=γUC(Ct+1,Lt+1)[α(1+rtD)+(1−α)]
5. αSt=Dt
6. ΠFirm=[AtKt−1β Nt1−β−wtNt−[Kt−(1−δ)Kt−1](1+rt)]
7. Kt=(1−δ)Kt−1+ It
8. It ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt
9. (1+ rt)UC(Ct, Lt)=γUC(Ct+1, Lt+1)[β(Nt+1/Kt)1−β+(1+ rt
+1)(1−δ)]
10. wt=(1−β)(Nt/Kt−1)β
11. ΠBank ¼ 1þ rtð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
CRt− 1þ rDt−1
 
Dt−1
12. CRt≤Dt−1
13. 1þ rtð Þ ¼ 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p 
1þ rDt−1
 
Appendix 2
Comparative statics (homogenous producers and perfectly com-
petitive banks).
1. ∂ 1þrtð Þ∂α ¼−
1þrDt−1ð Þ
2α3=2 b 0:
2. ∂wt∂α ¼
β 1−βð Þcrt
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
 
1−δð Þ Kt−1Nt þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
p
crt
h iβ−1
N 0:  1  	 

D
 h i 
3. ∂crt∂α ¼ β1þrt
1−β 1
1−βð Þ 1þrtð Þ
1þrtð Þ
2 þ
1þrt
α
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α
p 1
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